-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 >http://frogadmin.yi.org/Fallacy/NoLog.html > > >The 'No-Log' Fallacy > > > >'The key issue is that remailers are not supposed to keep any logs'. > >If *no_log* was the founding principle of remailers, it would not >work. > >Whether the remop *himself* keeps logs or not is *totally* irrelevant, >because quite a few *other* people *MAY* keep logs and some actually >*DO*: Which "other" people, you deceptive, lying sack of french pig shit? >For what goes INTO the remailer >..--sender's ISP >..--sender's SMTP provider >..--redirection provider (a la Bigfoot/Sneakemail) >..--remailerīs POP provider >..--remailer's ISP >..--anybody sniffing around there So, and ISP knows his user is using the smtp machine. So what? Redirection? That's your forte. Hijacking e-mails from the user's defined chain and sending them through your own system. This is an unethical means by a re-mope such as yourself to increase your exit traffic stats and control what is published. The control is exercised when through this redirection you subject the user's post to your own filter system. This is blatant censorship, and twice arrogant because it is done in secret. It is a sure way of silencing any posts critical of yourself. See my repost regarding Frog "redirecting" - hijacking your posts: >For what EMERGES from the remailer >..--remailer's ISP >..--remailer's SMTP provider >..--redirection provider (a la Bigfoot/Sneakemail) >..--recipient's POP provider >..--recipient's ISP >..--anybody sniffing around there > >Crowded, isn't it? So what? Again there is nothing "damaging" nor revealing pertinent to the remailer poster. If the body text was meant for Usenet, who cares if the last remailer sees it. It cannot know who sent it. That only can happen when a deceitful sack of queer shit such as yourself runs a secret remailer. Then the poster's message just might go through your secret entry remailer, and because they used only a chain of two, might be seen exiting your normal remailer. Then you'd know who the sender was and what it was they sent. Put this together with your "redirection" crap, and it is obvious you are attempting to keep track of *everyone*. Does the name Azerty ring any bells, Frog? (In case you forgot, that's the secret remailer you used to "out" users.) >And I have direct-hand evidence that such third-party logging exists: >while discussing my activities with my first provider, >the tek I had on the phone would drop: >'You send lots of mail to Germany, don't you?' > Big deal? Even a newbie knows their ISP logs sent email. Hell, they even know what you're receiving. But that isn't supposed to be true with remailers, unless some crooked gangster such as yourself plays games with the hardware and software. >I don't keep logs because I found no use for them Would it surprise you, you lying prick, if we didn't believe you? >e.g. I did not need any log to catch the 3 flooders I OUTed >but sure I would not have any moral problem with it: You're a lying shit. You admitted you got them through your secret remailer, azerty. - - -- http://www.cotse.net/users/bluejay/frog/frog-discloses-azerty-frog-trap. txt or http://tinyurl.com/u0og "I run both Azerty (entry point) and Frog (emerging point) I did not have to consult with Noisebox." - - -- >I have a right to know *as_well_as_others* what is going through my >machine ..pretending to ignore what is common knowledge is a no-win >strategy. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 >http://frogadmin.yi.org/Fallacy/NoLog.html > > >The 'No-Log' Fallacy > > > >'The key issue is that remailers are not supposed to keep any logs'. > >If *no_log* was the founding principle of remailers, it would not >work. > >Whether the remop *himself* keeps logs or not is *totally* irrelevant, >because quite a few *other* people *MAY* keep logs and some actually >*DO*: Which "other" people, you deceptive, lying sack of french pig shit? >For what goes INTO the remailer >..--sender's ISP >..--sender's SMTP provider >..--redirection provider (a la Bigfoot/Sneakemail) >..--remailerīs POP provider >..--remailer's ISP >..--anybody sniffing around there So, and ISP knows his user is using the smtp machine. So what? Redirection? That's your forte. Hijacking e-mails from the user's defined chain and sending them through your own system. This is an unethical means by a re-mope such as yourself to increase your exit traffic stats and control what is published. The control is exercised when through this redirection you subject the user's post to your own filter system. This is blatant censorship, and twice arrogant because it is done in secret. It is a sure way of silencing any posts critical of yourself. See my repost regarding Frog "redirecting" - hijacking your posts: >For what EMERGES from the remailer >..--remailer's ISP >..--remailer's SMTP provider >..--redirection provider (a la Bigfoot/Sneakemail) >..--recipient's POP provider >..--recipient's ISP >..--anybody sniffing around there > >Crowded, isn't it? So what? Again there is nothing "damaging" nor revealing pertinent to the remailer poster. If the body text was meant for Usenet, who cares if the last remailer sees it. It cannot know who sent it. That only can happen when a deceitful sack of queer shit such as yourself runs a secret remailer. Then the poster's message just might go through your secret entry remailer, and because they used only a chain of two, might be seen exiting your normal remailer. Then you'd know who the sender was and what it was they sent. Put this together with your "redirection" crap, and it is obvious you are attempting to keep track of *everyone*. Does the name Azerty ring any bells, Frog? (In case you forgot, that's the secret remailer you used to "out" users.) >And I have direct-hand evidence that such third-party logging exists: >while discussing my activities with my first provider, >the tek I had on the phone would drop: >'You send lots of mail to Germany, don't you?' > Big deal? Even a newbie knows their ISP logs sent email. Hell, they even know what you're receiving. But that isn't supposed to be true with remailers, unless some crooked gangster such as yourself plays games with the hardware and software. >I don't keep logs because I found no use for them Would it surprise you, you lying prick, if we didn't believe you? >e.g. I did not need any log to catch the 3 flooders I OUTed >but sure I would not have any moral problem with it: You're a lying shit. You admitted you got them through your secret remailer, azerty. - - -- http://www.cotse.net/users/bluejay/frog/frog-discloses-azerty-frog-trap. txt or http://tinyurl.com/u0og "I run both Azerty (entry point) and Frog (emerging point) I did not have to consult with Noisebox." - - -- >I have a right to know *as_well_as_others* what is going through my >machine ..pretending to ignore what is common knowledge is a no-win >strategy. The whole idea behind remailers is that you do NOT have a "right" to know what is going through your machine. What is "common knowledge?" The exiting remailer Knowing the IP and email addy of the original sender is NOT "common knowledge," you lying dirtbag. That's only common knowledge if you run secret remailers which randomly capture some posts for entry and exit. Your entire psychology behind running a remailer is so that you can utterly control and "expose" anyone who does not do things your way. This attitude is the antithesis of that expected - no, demanded, of a remailer operator. (Does it yet begin to sink into the anon newbies reading this as to what you are letting yourself in for when you use Frog's machines?) >When your 18 months old puts a hand on his eyes and pretends >that nobody can see him because he can't see anything, >that is charming. When a grown-up does the same, it becomes rapidly >annoying. Your simple-minded simile is totally preposterous! > >The 'no-log' verse became some sort of mantra, of ritual invocation, >along with: 'you have to trust your remop'. They "trusted" you, didn't they? And you betrayed them with azerty, frog and frog2. You are constantly modifying Reliable in an effort to make it betray the users it is supposed to protect. >It shows a complete lack of understanding of the system, hides the >reality, and worst prevents users from taking mandatory actions. No! *You* show a complete lack of understanding of the purpose of the system. You are the *reality* of the *worst* that was not foreseen by Rprocess when he wrote JBN and Reliable. Nor foreseen by the architects of the remailer system. You are The Remop From Hell. >The truth is completely different: >....Remailer network is build on a "lack of trust" scheme >The *only* condition for an emerging mail not to be linked to its >original sender is that: ....'not *all* remailer operators in the >chain did cooperate to trace the mail' IOW: if there is only ONE >honest remop in the chain, you are safe The corollary is: >User is responsible for his own security >...by building chains as long as possible, As I've shown, you have destroyed this "lack of trust" system by running secret remailers. If a crooked son of a bitch like you runs enough secret remailers, it doesn't matter if we use a chain of three or four. Random chance will at times have people going through your entry and exit remailer, and sometimes, through the entire string of your remailers. With Azerty, you probably caught some sloppy users who used only a chain of two. Once an evil shit like you finds a way to cut a corner, the recidivist in you, having learned from past mistakes, will make damn sure to do it up even bigger next time - and to keep a loose mouth shut. It was your own loose lips that sunk azerty and showed exactly what a slimy piece of dog excrement you truly are. The other re-mopes should have banned you from the network right away - you and that other sack of shit "outer," eelbash/cheshire/bog/bogg. It is antithetical to security to make chains overly long. The same factor that protects with a medium chain or 3-4 hops, can increase the chance of running into compromised remailers when the chain gets ridiculously long. It is more pragmatic of me to think I know the personalities behind a small number of remailers than to foolishly assume I actually know the "trust" quotient of 6-10 remops, or whatever other silly figure you are espousing. You are merely seeking to justify you own outing of those individuals who did not chain properly. But the same could have happened with a reasonable chain of 3-4 when dealing with such a crooked, cheating, bastard-re-mope such as yourself. >...compatible with the reliability of the network. >Remailer operators provide reliability >...users trade it off for privacy That makes no sense at all. Reliability has little to do with privacy. It might affect my mail not getting through at times, but it hardly hinders nor aids privacy. More of your empty talking through your ass. > >If a remailer operator wanted to do do something really evil >_keeping_ *logs* would not be the nasty thing at all >What he should (not) do is: >_build_ a *database* holding the cross-reference >INPUT message-ID <> OUTPUT message-ID If the cops grab up your logs, they track who came in and where the next hop was. They follow through at each hop, and thanks to assholes like you, they find lots of logged details of what came in and to which remailer, group, or individual it went to. Logs can matter, you lying faggot shit-eater. >- -That is no mere log, this is a whole database with 2 entities and > n-m cardinality - -I know enough of Reliable's source code to tell > that >producing such information would require a *complete* rewrite > of the core process (message-IDs are stripped at a very early stage). > That's why you are constantly modifying Reliable. That is why you are in the VB groups asking how to make a database to collect and store headers, plus more. See: or http://tinyurl.com/tmni >IOW: >_build_ a totally new information, totally non-existent before >while (If my English is not too bad) >_keep_ suggests that the information existed beforehand > >So, if you are into mottos >'don't keep logs'is wrong on two counts: _keep_ and *log* >'don't build databases'would be more proper The only problem is that you are doing both, you weasel. > >That is valid for 'normal' mail and posts. >If you are a mass-mailer or a flooder, your mileage may vary, but >bottom line is .. > >--If you are a normal user, unless you do something really stupid you >are safe .. Yeah, tell it to the guys who went through azerty. Tell it to the guys who posted innocent multi-part binaries and were outed as flooders by you posting their addys and IP. All your "proof" consisted of was PGP encrypted messages, which were evidently parts of a large binary post. >--If you are a flooder and you take a few precautions, you are >safe.. You ought to know. You've been flooding apas for 4 years using your trick of multi smtp accounts. >--If you are a flooder and you don't take care and you are out of >luck, you might be in trouble. > You've made enough mistakes to get you in trouble. However, we have a new generation of non-judgemental re-mopes who couldn't care less about what you do. That ranges from your outing innocent people, running secret remailers, to including an innocent man's work e-mail address in your X-abuse header, and, finally, having a page of pirated software on your Web site. They are but little better than you. It is a sad state of affairs for the remailer system when I say I'd rather trust the outfit I'm posting through than those 35 or so amoral/immoral, dishonest re-mopes who are backing you. - -- * Bluejay * Here is where to get help setting up QuickSilver http://www.cotse.net/users/bluejay/qs/menu.html Read About The Frog Who Would Be King http://www.cotse.net/users/bluejay/frog/declaration.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPfreeware 6.5.8 for non-commercial use iQA/AwUBP7J0dr0qIgPfZwtYEQJcaACgtpOeeVSV8aP5NDcP049elgtMgmUAoO96 175StFGfPA1YJ55UnWl8XpHM =ziYK -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- The whole idea behind remailers is that you do NOT have a "right" to know what is going through your machine. What is "common knowledge?" The exiting remailer Knowing the IP and email addy of the original sender is NOT "common knowledge," you lying dirtbag. That's only common knowledge if you run secret remailers which randomly capture some posts for entry and exit. Your entire psychology behind running a remailer is so that you can utterly control and "expose" anyone who does not do things your way. This attitude is the antithesis of that expected - no, demanded, of a remailer operator. (Does it yet begin to sink into the anon newbies reading this as to what you are letting yourself in for when you use Frog's machines?) >When your 18 months old puts a hand on his eyes and pretends >that nobody can see him because he can't see anything, >that is charming. When a grown-up does the same, it becomes rapidly >annoying. Your simple-minded simile is totally preposterous! > >The 'no-log' verse became some sort of mantra, of ritual invocation, >along with: 'you have to trust your remop'. They "trusted" you, didn't they? And you betrayed them with azerty, frog and frog2. You are constantly modifying Reliable in an effort to make it betray the users it is supposed to protect. >It shows a complete lack of understanding of the system, hides the >reality, and worst prevents users from taking mandatory actions. No! *You* show a complete lack of understanding of the purpose of the system. You are the *reality* of the *worst* that was not foreseen by Rprocess when he wrote JBN and Reliable. Nor foreseen by the architects of the remailer system. You are The Remop From Hell. >The truth is completely different: >....Remailer network is build on a "lack of trust" scheme >The *only* condition for an emerging mail not to be linked to its >original sender is that: ....'not *all* remailer operators in the >chain did cooperate to trace the mail' IOW: if there is only ONE >honest remop in the chain, you are safe The corollary is: >User is responsible for his own security >...by building chains as long as possible, As I've shown, you have destroyed this "lack of trust" system by running secret remailers. If a crooked son of a bitch like you runs enough secret remailers, it doesn't matter if we use a chain of three or four. Random chance will at times have people going through your entry and exit remailer, and sometimes, through the entire string of your remailers. With Azerty, you probably caught some sloppy users who used only a chain of two. Once an evil shit like you finds a way to cut a corner, the recidivist in you, having learned from past mistakes, will make damn sure to do it up even bigger next time - and to keep a loose mouth shut. It was your own loose lips that sunk azerty and showed exactly what a slimy piece of dog excrement you truly are. The other re-mopes should have banned you from the network right away - you and that other sack of shit "outer," eelbash/cheshire/bog/bogg. It is antithetical to security to make chains overly long. The same factor that protects with a medium chain or 3-4 hops, can increase the chance of running into compromised remailers when the chain gets ridiculously long. It is more pragmatic of me to think I know the personalities behind a small number of remailers than to foolishly assume I actually know the "trust" quotient of 6-10 remops, or whatever other silly figure you are espousing. You are merely seeking to justify you own outing of those individuals who did not chain properly. But the same could have happened with a reasonable chain of 3-4 when dealing with such a crooked, cheating, bastard-re-mope such as yourself. >...compatible with the reliability of the network. >Remailer operators provide reliability >...users trade it off for privacy That makes no sense at all. Reliability has little to do with privacy. It might affect my mail not getting through at times, but it hardly hinders nor aids privacy. More of your empty talking through your ass. > >If a remailer operator wanted to do do something really evil >_keeping_ *logs* would not be the nasty thing at all >What he should (not) do is: >_build_ a *database* holding the cross-reference >INPUT message-ID <> OUTPUT message-ID If the cops grab up your logs, they track who came in and where the next hop was. They follow through at each hop, and thanks to assholes like you, they find lots of logged details of what came in and to which remailer, group, or individual it went to. Logs can matter, you lying faggot shit-eater. >- -That is no mere log, this is a whole database with 2 entities and > n-m cardinality - -I know enough of Reliable's source code to tell > that >producing such information would require a *complete* rewrite > of the core process (message-IDs are stripped at a very early stage). > That's why you are constantly modifying Reliable. That is why you are in the VB groups asking how to make a database to collect and store headers, plus more. See: or http://tinyurl.com/tmni >IOW: >_build_ a totally new information, totally non-existent before >while (If my English is not too bad) >_keep_ suggests that the information existed beforehand > >So, if you are into mottos >'don't keep logs'is wrong on two counts: _keep_ and *log* >'don't build databases'would be more proper The only problem is that you are doing both, you weasel. > >That is valid for 'normal' mail and posts. >If you are a mass-mailer or a flooder, your mileage may vary, but >bottom line is .. > >--If you are a normal user, unless you do something really stupid you >are safe .. Yeah, tell it to the guys who went through azerty. Tell it to the guys who posted innocent multi-part binaries and were outed as flooders by you posting their addys and IP. All your "proof" consisted of was PGP encrypted messages, which were evidently parts of a large binary post. >--If you are a flooder and you take a few precautions, you are >safe.. You ought to know. You've been flooding apas for 4 years using your trick of multi smtp accounts. >--If you are a flooder and you don't take care and you are out of >luck, you might be in trouble. > You've made enough mistakes to get you in trouble. However, we have a new generation of non-judgemental re-mopes who couldn't care less about what you do. That ranges from your outing innocent people, running secret remailers, to including an innocent man's work e-mail address in your X-abuse header, and, finally, having a page of pirated software on your Web site. They are but little better than you. It is a sad state of affairs for the remailer system when I say I'd rather trust the outfit I'm posting through than those 35 or so amoral/immoral, dishonest re-mopes who are backing you. - -- * Bluejay * Here is where to get help setting up QuickSilver http://www.cotse.net/users/bluejay/qs/menu.html Read About The Frog Who Would Be King http://www.cotse.net/users/bluejay/frog/declaration.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPfreeware 6.5.8 for non-commercial use iQA/AwUBP7J0dr0qIgPfZwtYEQJcaACgtpOeeVSV8aP5NDcP049elgtMgmUAoO96 175StFGfPA1YJ55UnWl8XpHM =ziYK -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----